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The Life Cycle Model of the Fertility Choice in 
Hungary*
Petra Németh  
In this paper, we model the Hungarian fertility choice at the micro level. We outline 
a life cycle model in which a representative family makes decisions on its number of 
children, the timing of having children and the mother’s return to work after having 
children over the course of its life cycle. In constructing the model, we incorporate 
the factors influencing the decision to have children (with a particular emphasis on 
the family benefits scheme between 2006–2014) and how the behaviours of various 
household types (in terms of qualifications) differ from each other. According to 
the simulation results, among the family support tools presented, the family tax 
allowance scheme introduced in 2011 has a significant impact on the final number 
of children, maternal age and the timing of childbearing among low and medium 
education families. The measures introduced in 2014 provide incentive to have 
three children in all educational groups and foster the early labour market return 
of mothers. To our knowledge, no similar modelling attempts have been made so 
far in the Hungarian literature. 
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: C61, D91, H31, J13, J18 
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1. Introduction
The objective of this paper is to model the decision to have children in Hungary 
at the micro level, in order to expand the current body of material on this topic. 
In constructing the model, we incorporated the domestic factors influencing the 
decision to have children (with a particular emphasis on the family benefits scheme) 
and how the behaviours of various household types (in terms of qualification) differ 
from each other. To our knowledge, there have been no similar attempts to date in 
the Hungarian literature to create a model for the optimal timing of having children.
A substantial body of literature exists on the modelling of women’s fertility 
and labour decisions, but the modelling technique vary widely. The foremost 
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representatives of one of the main directions describe women’s fertility and 
sequential labour supply decisions in a dynamic model, also known as the life cycle 
model under specific circumstances and conditions. The common feature of these 
models is that they assume optimising economic agents and factor in all direct and 
indirect costs and benefits associated with having children. Solving or structurally 
estimating these types of dynamic models gives us answers to several key questions 
such as family policy allowances and the role of childcare institutions in life cycle 
decisions, as well as explanations for decreasing fertility, changes in female labour 
supply and the differences in the fertility and labour supply decisions between 
countries (Arroyo – Zhang 1997, Hotz et al. 1997, Francesconi 2002, Del Boca – 
Sauer 2009, Bick 2010, Keane – Wolpin 2010). In this model framework, we can 
also investigate not only the optimal number of children, but also the optimal time 
interval between births.
Hotz, Klerman and Willis (1997) and Arroyo and Zhang (1997) provide a broad 
overview of the structure, characteristics and solvability of the dynamic or life cycle 
model investigating the fertility decision, while the work of Gábos (2005) provides 
a summary in Hungarian. Francesconi (2002) estimated a dynamic structural model 
in which married women make labour supply and fertility decisions. Women 
differ according to their full-time or part-time work status. The model yielded an 
important result in several regards, of which the most relevant one for our topic 
is: if the mother works full time and has a child, she will achieve a significantly 
lower lifetime utility if she stays off the labour market for an extended period after 
childbirth compared to staying off the labour market for a short period. However, 
this difference is negligible among women with part-time work. Keane and Wolpin 
(2010) also used a structurally estimated life cycle model to quantify the extent to 
which the difference in preference, the available welfare services and differences in 
labour market opportunities determined the life cycle decisions of Spanish women 
with various characteristics. Del Boca and Sauer (2009) estimated a decision rule 
derived from the life cycle model using data from Italy, France and Spain and 
drew conclusions from this on the link between the institutional environment, 
labour market flexibility, childcare institutions and activity and fertility decisions. 
Bick (2010) investigated two reforms recently introduced in Germany using a life 
cycle model calibrated to German data. His main line of investigation is the role 
of subsidised early childhood childcare in the life cycle labour supply of married 
women and their willingness to have children. Based on the results of the model, 
Bick (2010) concludes that the labour market activity and fertility of women with 
children under three years of age is positively influenced by the availability of 
subsidised crèches.
Mainly tied to Bick’s (2010) paper, we build a microeconomics-based dynamic or 
life cycle model to determine the optimal childbearing strategy for Hungary that 
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factors in the fertility choice, resuming work after having children and the temporal 
links between the factors shaping the decision to have children and the mechanism 
of action between them. Accordingly, we would like to lay the foundations of a life 
cycle model that takes into account and factors in to such extent as is practicable 
the domestic economic and institutional factors and environment that influence/
determine a family’s fertility decisions and the subsequent return to work. These 
factors are: daytime childcare options for young children; the mother and father’s 
education, labour market status and labour income; family allowances and tax rules. 
Among these, we focus particularly on investigating the role of family policy tools 
on fertility decisions. We would like to especially emphasise that – for modelling 
purposes – we ignored every other factor that we knew has or may have a significant 
impact on fertility choice, including changes in values, the spread of new types of 
relationships, cultural and biological factors or the family’s housing conditions. In 
summary, we outline the life cycle decisions of women having completed their 
studies, but still of childbearing potential given the specific support and paid leave 
system, while the model’s resolution is based on comparing the direct and indirect 
costs and benefits of having children.
The model ultimately shows that given a specific support environment, when to 
have children and how many children are optimal with how much labour market 
absence for families is characterised by different parameters (different education). 
In other words, the model gives us an answer as to how the many transformations 
of the family benefits scheme influence families’ optimal childbearing and in what 
direction, all other things being equal. Based on the model, we also attempt to 
offer an explanation to in-depth questions such as which benefits affect the timing 
of childbearing and which benefits foster a quick return to the labour market; 
which benefits best contribute to childbearing by families with various degrees of 
education; how does the optimal childbearing strategy of families with different 
degrees of education differ under a specific benefits system. We look at three 
various family support regimes: the regime prevailing in 2006–2010, the one in 
2011–2013 and the new legislative package on support and paid leave for mothers 
with small children adopted in 2014 (referred to as GYED-extra).
In the following, this paper is structured as follows: After the introduction, we 
outline the life cycle model and its resolution in Chapter 2 and provide and calibrate 
the model’s parameters. In Chapter 3, based on the model’s simulation results we 
present how a specific support and tax scheme influences the life cycle decisions 
on childbearing and female employment of families with different degrees of 
education, while Chapter 4 summarises the results of the model and presents the 
final conclusions.
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2. The life cycle model of fertility choices under various family 
benefits schemes
In accordance with the literature, the model features the following general 
characteristics: It is first made up of a man and a woman who make a decision on 
their number of children and the timing of childbearing, on the utilisation of their 
time and incomes during their life cycle. The couple maximises its lifetime utility 
characterised by constant preference ordering1 given specific time and budgetary 
constraints, and given the factors shaping the number of children and the raising 
of children and the technological constraints shaping the woman’s productivity. 
The man and the woman’s human capital increases with age/experience (and, as 
a result, their labour income), but at a decreasing rate, and the mother’s human 
capital amortises during the time spent at home on maternity leave, in other words 
if she leaves the labour market (Bartus et al. 2013). In terms of the general structure, 
we supplemented or simplified the known modelling framework in several regards 
(adjusted to the Hungarian environment) and thus work based on the following 
specific life cycle model.
A typical family’s joint life cycle decision on having children and working is 
considered realistic at different ages depending on its level of education, but the 
model investigates a 20-year period uniformly for every level of education. We 
also assume that the start of work is also the potential start of the option of having 
children irrespective of the degree of education. We determined the age for starting 
work based on the age published in the 2012 Hungarian Labour Market Yearbook 
and corresponding to the starting age for earning included in the 2011 age-income 
profiles: the examined career begins at age 18 for the unskilled and those with low 
qualification, at age 20 for those with medium qualification and at age 25 for those 
with high educational qualification (Fazekas – Benczúr – Telegdy (edit.) 2012:372, 
Figure 6.3.4). In addition, in line with the data, we can also assume that most 
women in Hungary currently have a child before the age of 45 and most women 
have their first child before the age of 30 on average (KSH 2015:53, Table 4.1.3).
We know, however, that having a child is a lifelong commitment and can be a 
significant cost/benefit for the family until the child turns 25. It would therefore be 
warranted for the couple to consider its decision to have children in light of their 
entire lifetime. However, we rejected this option for two reasons. For one, in line 
with the literature, we also use the simplifying assumption that borrowing or saving 
is not possible in either period (Arroyo – Zhang 1997; Hotz et. al 1997; Francesconi 
2002; Del Boca – Sauer 2009; Bick 2010; Keane – Wolpin 2010). For this reason, 
we are unable to model either the flow of wealth between nations or long-term 
1  This assumption is important because we are currently not looking at the effect of changes in preference, 
that is, of changes in value on fertility.
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care for the child in this framework. The other reason is that we do not think that 
someone who is planning to have a child in the near future is able to calculate or 
thoroughly consider the associated costs over the long term, i.e. over the next 
20–25 years. Even if they could, it is improbable that this would substantially change 
their current decision.
The woman is the household’s actual decision-maker, meaning it is she who decides 
during every period on consumption, childbearing and, if she has a young child, on 
labour, while the man has a passive role and works during every period (with the 
exception of families with education of less than eight years of elementary school) 
(Hotz et al. 1997; Keane – Wolpin 2010; Fehr – Ujhelyiova 2011). We assume that 
in periods when the family has no young children or does not yet have any young 
children, the woman works full time (except if the mother has education of less than 
eight years of elementary school, in which case she remains inactive throughout 
her entire lifetime). However, if there is a small child under the age of three in the 
family, the woman can decide about returning to work. Furthermore, each family 
can have three children at most in the model, only one child can be born per period2 
and the woman dedicates all of the time to child-raising in the years when a child 
is born. After they are born, the children consume similarly to their parents, and if 
the mother works, the children require childcare during early childhood (e.g. public 
crèche, family day-care, private crèche). We do not differentiate between the raising 
of children in the model,3 which may be a function of how much different parents 
spend on their child’s education and training. For the sake of simplicity, we assume 
that free pre-school and school is available for every child at the same standard, and 
therefore we regard the cost of caring for children over the age of three as zero. We 
do not incorporate it into the model that the costs of raising children may change 
as a function of the child’s age and the parents’ education (Bartus et al. 2013).
In the model, we distinguish between families based on the parents’ highest 
level of completed education. Investigating based on education is warranted for 
several reasons. For one, the productivity of an unskilled couple, a couple with low 
qualification, medium qualification or high qualification and thus their income profile 
differs over the course of their lifetime (Bartus et al. 2013). In addition, several family 
benefits in Hungary depend on income or are at least tied to employment therefore 
in conjunction with the different educational levels these benefits offer quite 
different economic incentives for having children. Accordingly, we view the model 
separately for decision-makers representing an unskilled group (up to eight grades 
of elementary school), a group with low qualification (vocational training, vocational 
school), medium qualification (high school) and high qualification (higher education), 
2  We assume that the probability of infant mortality is zero.
3  The trade-off between the number of children and the quality of children is addressed in the work of Becker 
(1993) and Bick (2010).
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and symbolise the highest completed level of education with the starting gross 
salary and productivity parameters. For men, we assume an exogenous productivity 
profile depending on age and qualification level. By contrast, the productivity profile 
for women is endogenous, because we factor in that she does not work during the 
period when she is raising a child and her human capital accumulated up to that 
point amortises (Bartus et al. 2013). For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the 
individuals making up a household have the same level of education.4 We estimated 
the productivity trajectory parameters in the 2010 and 2011 environment based on 
2011 real gross wages and in the 2014 environment based on 2013 real gross wages 
for men and women and for every educational level.
We solved the basic model for three different support environments for each 
educational level under the family support regime prevailing in 2010, in 2011 
and the new regime introduced in 2014. The eligibility criteria for family benefits 
have changed substantially since 1 January 2014, and a new system that is more 
flexible in several points was adopted. In summary, all of the state tools that provide 
additional (disposable) income for families after they have children fall under the 
umbrella of family support; this concept therefore includes cash and family benefits5 
and the family tax incentive system (according to the definition given by Ignits – 
Kapitány 2006).
To the extent allowed by an abstract model, we attempted to realistically incorporate 
the eligibility rules for benefits under the old and new regimes, the amount of 
benefits, the prevailing taxation rules and the income trajectories by educational 
level. However, we ignored other transfers as they are not closely tied to our main 
topic. In summary, we made the following assumptions in our model:
•  We distinguish for educational levels: unskilled (up to eight grades of elementary 
school), low qualification (vocational training, vocational school), medium 
qualification (high school) and high qualification (higher education).
•  The father works during every period and throughout his time if he has at least 
a low level of education. Unqualified fathers only spend a portion of their time 
working.
•  The mother does not work until the child is one year old, can decide on working 
when the child is between one and three years old and works full time once the 
child is older than three. Unqualified women are an exception to this and spend 
all of their time at home irrespective of age or number of children.
4  There is empirical evidence that women with higher qualification typically choose a partner with higher 
qualification (Becker 1981; Bartus et al. 2013).
5  Cash benefits include the prenatal allowance and the childcare allowance, while family benefits include the 
maternity allowance, the family allowance, childcare benefits and the child-raising allowance.
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•  Daytime childcare for young children costs money.
•  We consider the period between 18 and 37 years of age as the childbearing period 
for unskilled women and women with low education, between 20 and 39 years 
for women with medium education and between 25 and 44 years for women 
with high education.
In addition, we consider the following “fertility and labour life cycles” as the baseline 
and feel that these are an accurate reflection of reality for an average family with 
high, medium, low or no education:6
•  A typical unskilled woman will have her first child at the age of 20, and we assume 
that she will remain inactive for the rest of her life.
•  A typical woman with low education will have her first child at the age of 27, have 
two children consecutively and spend five years on average off the labour market.
•  A typical woman with medium education will have one child at the age of 29 and 
spend three years off the labour market.
•  A typical woman with high qualification (higher education) will have one child at 
the age of 31 and spend three years off the labour market.
In the following subchapters, we outline the costs and benefits of a family after they 
have children; we present the theoretical model that we built and its resolution, 
and finally we provide and calibrate the model’s parameters.
2.1. Costs and benefits of raising children
Having and raising children is associated with the following direct and indirect costs 
for families in the model:7
•  the consumption of children (direct)
•  costs for daytime childcare for young children if the mother works (direct)
•  the mother’s lost current income during her years spent at home (indirect)
•  the mother’s human capital loss reflected in lower lifetime income (indirect)
•  the one-off fixed cost of the mother’s return to the labour market which increases 
with the number of children (representing the utility of household work) (indirect)
6  We must emphasise that when interpreting the results, these assumptions will serve as a baseline but will 
not influence the results.
7  András Gábos and Iván Gál Róbert factor similar components into the cost of raising children (Gábos – Gál 
– Keller 2007).
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From another perspective, having children is beneficial for families for the following 
reasons:
•  The child is a source of joy. The instantaneous utility function is therefore positively 
dependent on the number of children.
•  Families are eligible for numerous transfers if they have children (family support 
and social security cash benefits).
•  Parents are also eligible for the family tax incentive if they have children.
2.2. The household’s decision-making problem
2.2.1. Lifetime utility
The maximisable lifetime utility function takes on the following form in the model:
 V = β t−1u cit ,nit( )
t=1
Ti
∑ , (1)
where 0 < β < 1 is the impatience parameter, u(.,.) is the instantaneous utility 
function8 which is the unit of consumption expressed in money (cit ) and the 
additively separable function of the current number of children (nit):
 u cit ,nit( )=
1+ cit( )1−σ −1
1−σ +Ω
1+nit( )1−ε −1
1− ε
, (2)
where σ is the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (σ > 0, σ ≠ 1), Ω 
shows the weight of the number of children within decision-making preferences and ε 
measures how the utility function value reacts to changes in the number of children. 
In the lower index, i refers to the type of household based on educational level while 
T is the length of the examined life cycle, and t pertains to the period under review. 
We assume that the man and the woman have the same level of completed education 
which may be one of the following four: unskilled, low, medium or high education, 
respectively shown as i=0,1,2,3. Irrespective of educational level, the life cycle decision 
to have children is investigated over a 20-year period, although this applies to the 
period between 18 and 37 years of age for unskilled individuals and those with low 
qualification, between 20 and 39 years of age for individuals with medium education 
and between 25 and 44 years of age for individuals with high education.
2.2.2. Changes in the number of children over time
mit ϵ {0,1} is the number of children to be born during the period under review, 
which is equal to 0 if no children are born at the time t and 1 if a child is born. If 
8  Bick (2010) and Jones (2010) used a form of function similar to ours. Bick and others included women’s 
leisure time in the momentary utility function, but in our case, it is equal to zero.
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mit = 1, then the number of children, nit increases by one. Only one child can be 
born per year, that is
 nit = nit−1 +mit , (3)
assuming that the children outlive their parents.
2.2.3. The budget constraint
We assume that neither saving nor borrowing is possible and so the family spends 
all of the income after tax from the man’s work (indicated in the upper index as m) 
and the woman’s work (indicated in the upper index as f) and the transfers granted 
based on their children on consumption and if necessary for the children’s daytime 
care and the other costs of starting work. Accordingly, the budgetary constraints 
for a family of type i in the year t under the 2010 regime will be:
 weit
mLi
m +weitfLitf −TAXt +TRt = cit 1.7+0.5nit( )+ pLitf mit−1 +mit−2( )+k 1− Lit−1f( )Litf  (4)
where the man and the woman’s gross wage is the real wage per efficiency unit w( ) 
obtained as a multiple of productivity eit
m ,eit
f( )  and hours worked Lim ,Litf( ) . The family 
pays tax during every period, the sum of which following deduction of the family tax 
allowance is TAXt. All tax burdens are incurred differently under the various regimes 
due to changes in the family tax incentive and tax rules (see below). The benefits 
granted based on children further boost revenues, marked as TRt during the period 
t (see below). The family must use its sources of income to cover all of its outlays, 
including its total consumption expressed as a multiple of a unit of consumption 
(cit) and the OECD scale.9 Another expense is incurred if the mother returns to 
work when her child is between one and three years of age (mit-1 = 1 or mit-2 = 1), 
in which case daytime childcare must be arranged; the unit cost of this expressed 
in hours worked is p. The mother’s time spent at home is not only useful in terms 
of childcare, but also for performing household chores. This is symbolised by the 
cost k, which is the one-off cost of the mother returning to the labour market. The 
value of the parameter k increases in parallel to the number of children.
Productivity profile. The man’s productivity during his lifetime follows an exogenous 
trajectory depending on his age and education (Hotz et al. 1997; Attanasio et al. 
2008; Keane – Wolpin 2010; Fehr – Ujhelyiova 2011). We describe developments 
in productivity as a function of the highest completed education (symbolised by 
the parameters ai
m ,γ im ) , the amount of work experience (t) and the productivity 
level of the previous period eit−1
m( ), similarly to the 2008 paper of Attanasio et. al.:
 eit
m = eit−1m eα i
m+γ imt , where α im > 0, γ im < 0 , (5)
9  The OECD equivalence scale is the most prevalent in the literature, which assumes the consumption of the 
first adult among those sharing a household as one unit, the consumption of every additional adult as 0.7 
units and the consumption of every child as 0.5 units (OECD 1982).
14 Studies
Petra Németh  
where the function’s parameters differ by educational level (i). We also assume that 
the age of the man and the woman and their highest level of completed education 
are the same. The woman’s productivity profile is defined endogenously because it 
depends on the labour supply decision also besides the qualification and the work 
experience (Attanasio et al. 2008). If the woman works during the period under 
review Lit
f =1( ) , then her knowledge acquired until then will increase relative to the 
previous period at the same rate as the man’s, while if she does not work Lit
f = 0( ), 
then her productivity up to that point amortises at a rate of δ, that is:
 eit
f = eit−1f e
α if +γ ift( )Litf −δ 1−Litf( )( ) , where α if > 0, γ if < 0 . (6)
Amount of taxes under the 2010, 2011 and 2014 regimes. In 2010, personal income 
tax (τ1) was due based on the consolidated tax base (gross wage plus 27 per cent, 
also referred to as super gross) while social contributions (pension contribution (τ2), 
health insurance contribution (τ3), labour market contribution (τ4)) were charged 
to the gross wage (NAV 2016). There was also an opportunity for tax credits which 
we factored into the model. We specify the accurate parameters in Subchapter 2.4. 
The family tax incentive (indicated as tax1 per child) was granted as a tax rebate if 
a family had three or more children (Blaskó 2009). The total tax burden decreased 
by the family tax incentive can be calculated for 2010 as follows:
 TAXit
2010 = τ 1 ⋅1.27+τ 2 +τ 3 +τ 4( ) weitmLim +weitfLitf( )−nit ⋅tax1 . (7)
By 2011 the tax regime had become a single-rate regime, but super grossing and tax 
crediting were still employed. Contributions were still due based on the gross wage 
(NAV 2016). Starting from 2011, the family tax incentive for families with children – 
the rate per child of which depends on the number of children and is represented 
by tax2(nit) – is an item which reduces the tax base and is deducted from the super 
gross wage (NEFMI 2011). Accordingly, the total tax burden decreased by the family 
tax incentive can be calculated for 2011 as follows:
TAXit
2011 = τ 1 ⋅ 1.27 weitmLim +weitfLitf( )−nit ⋅tax2 nit( )( )+ τ 2 +τ 3 +τ 4( ) weitmLim +weitfLitf( )  (8)
By 2014, super grossing was abolished, and thus personal income tax and 
contributions were also due based on the gross wage (NAV 2016). The family tax 
incentive remained as an item which reduced the tax base, but the tax incentive 
was expanded to encompass a family contribution incentive from 1 January 
2014. Accordingly, if the family is unable to apply the full family incentive due 
to insufficient taxable income, it had the option to decrease its health insurance 
contribution, and later its pension contribution, by 16 per cent of the unapplied 
sum (or a portion thereof); we factored in the specific conditions of this regulation 
in solving the model (EMMI 2014). Total tax payable can thus be expressed based 
on TAXit
2014 as follows:
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TAXit
2014 = τ 1 ⋅ weitmLim +weitfLitf −nit ⋅tax2 nit( )( )+ τ 2 +τ 3 +τ 4( ) weitmLim +weitfLitf( )−
−0.16 ⋅ nit ⋅tax2 nit( )−weitmLim +weitfLitf( )
 (9)
Size of transfers under the 2010 and 2011 regimes. If a child is born in a family 
(mit=1), the mother first becomes entitled to a maternity allowance (TR0) as a 
guaranteed right (MÁK 2014). Until the child turns one, the mother receives a 
prenatal allowance10 (tgyás, represented by TRt1 ), which amounts to 70 per cent 
of the mother’s real income earned in the year preceding the birth of the child and 
is only subject to the deduction of advance personal income tax (τ1):
 TRt1 = 1−τ 1( )⋅0.7wieit−1f Lit−1f  (10)
(OEP 2014). However, if the mother has another child and does not return to the 
labour market between the two births, the most she can received after the second 
child is a prenatal allowance of TR 1 . Afterwards, the mother is eligible for the 
childcare benefit (gyed, represented by TRt
2 ) until the child turns two, which also 
rises to 70 per cent of the mother’s real income earned in the year preceding the 
birth of the child, which is also subject to a pension contribution payment obligation 
(τ2) besides the advance personal income tax and its amount is maximised TR 2( ) , 
that is:
 TRt
2 =min 1−τ 1 −τ 2( )⋅0.7wieit−2f Lit−2f ;TR 2{ }  (11)
(OEP 2014). During parental leave, the mother is eligible for childcare benefits (gyes) 
as a guaranteed right, which is a fixed sum and is only subject to the deduction of 
a pension contribution (represented, after the deduction of contributions, by TR3). 
If the mother returns to work after the child turns one, she loses eligibility for the 
childcare allowance, but will become eligible for childcare benefits alongside her 
earned income11 (MÁK 2014). Families with three children receive childcare benefits 
during their entire life cycle, not only until the children turn three,12 which we took 
into consideration in our programming. The family receives a family allowance for 
every child from the time of their birth (TR4(nit)), which is a fixed sum and its amount 
depends on the number of children (MÁK 2014).
The amount of transfers under the 2010 and 2011 regimes (TRt
2010/2011 ) are 
determined as:
10  In reality, the prenatal allowance is only granted in the first 24 weeks and from then on, the mother can 
apply for childcare allowance until the child turns one. For the sake of simplicity, we nevertheless assume in 
the model that the mother receives a prenatal allowance until the child turns one and childcare allowance 
when the child is between one and two years old.
11  Here, we diverged from the actual policy, because under the 2011 regime, mothers could work up to 30 
hours per week while receiving childcare benefits instead of full time.
12  In reality, this benefit is known as the child-raising allowance (gyet), which is in fact the same amount as 
the childcare benefit.
.
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TRt
2010/2011 =TR0mit +TRt1mit +TRt2mit−1 1− Litf( ) 1−mit( )+TR3mit−2 1−mit−1( ) 1−mit( )+
+TR4 nit( )nit  (12)
In solving the model, we also factored in that the childcare allowance is only granted 
to the mother if she was insured before giving birth ( Lit−2
f =1 , or TRt−21 =1, or TRt2 =1) 
and does not work when the child is between one and two years old. If the mother 
did not have valid insurance, she will still receive childcare benefits until her child 
turns two as follows:
TRt
2010/2011 =TR0mit +TR3mit +TR3mit−1 1−mit( )+TR3mit−2 1−mit−1( ) 1−mit( )+
+TR4 nit( )nit  
(13)
If there are several children under the age of three, the mother is only entitled 
to one benefit among the prenatal allowance, the childcare allowance and the 
childcare benefit under this regime.
Size of transfers under the 2014 regime. In the context of the extra childcare 
allowance (GYED-extra), the same benefits are available from 2014 and the amount 
of support (with the exception of the gyed maximum) and calculation method are 
the same. However, eligibility for these benefits changed significantly in two regards: 
one is that mothers can work full time while receiving the childcare allowance and 
the other is that the mother is eligible for several benefits if she had multiple young 
children. Accordingly, we calculate the amount of benefits under this family benefits 
scheme (TRt
2004 ) differently than earlier:
 TRt
2014 =TR0mit +TRt1mit +TRt2mit−1 +TR3mit−2 +TR4 nit( )nit . (14)
If the mother does not gain eligibility for the prenatal allowance and the childcare 
allowance, she can only receive childcare benefits during the first two years:
 TRt
2014 =TR0mit +TR3mit +TR3mit−1 +TR3mit−2 +TR4 nit( )nit . (15)
2.2.4. Time constraint
One usual assumption in the literature is that the man works full time during every 
period, that is Li
m =1  (working time is normalised to one) (Hotz et al. 1997). We, 
however, only deem this assumption acceptable taking account of the stylised facts 
for a representative family of low, medium or high educational level (i = 1,2,3). By 
contrast, an unskilled breadwinner only spends 15 per cent of his time working 
during every period, that is, L0
m = 0.15 . Among women, we distinguish between 
unskilled and qualified women.13
13  See footnote 17 for an explanation of the choice of parameters.
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In the model, we assume that the unskilled woman does not work irrespective of 
whether or not she has a child, that is, L0t
f = 0  during every period. If, however, 
the woman has at least a low educational level (i = 1,2,3), we use several limiting 
assumptions in her case. The woman’s labour supply Lit
f  can take on two discrete 
values, zero and one. If the family does not yet have or no longer has any young 
children, the woman works full time, that is:
 Lit
f =1, if mit ,mit−1 ,mit−2 = 0 and  if i =1,2, 3  (16)
We also assume that the woman does not work in the year of having the child, 
that is
 Lit
f = 0, if mit =1 and  if i =1,2, 3 . (17)
However, if the mother’s child is between one and three years old, she must make 
a decision on working (or having more children), considering the associated costs 
and benefits. In this case, the woman has two options: either working full time or 
raising the child full time:
 Lit
f = 0,1{ }, if mit−1 =1 or mit−2 =1 and  if i =1,2, 3 . (18)
Although the change is radical between the two options,14 this assumption is not far 
removed from reality, as the part-time employment of women in Hungary is still low.
2.3. Resolving the household’s decision-making problem
Resolving the household’s dynamic problem can be expressed in the following 
manner. The household maximises its lifetime utility with the constraints presented 
in the previous chapter. The woman’s decision-making problem to be represented 
using the following Belman equation:
 Vit
Lfm =max u cit ,nit( )+βVit+1Lfm , ∀t <Ti
Vit
Lfm =max u cit ,nit( ), t =Ti
 (19)
where VL
fm  is the value function. We resolve the model recursively, progressing 
backwards from the last period according to the dynamic programming model 
with the help of a MATLAB software package. In the model, the woman must make 
decisions throughout the life cycle on consumption (cit), childbearing (mit) and 
labour ( Lit
f ) in possession of the parameters and exogenous status variables  Li
m ,eit
m( ). 
We also assume that the couple’s decision is characterised by perfect foresight and 
that the family benefits scheme and tax rules under review (2006–2010, 2011–2013 
or 2014) will remain in place throughout their lifetime. It is based on this that we 
are seeking the “best mit − Litf  series of combinations” throughout the life cycle that 
14  While the mother receives childcare benefits, the employer has an obligation to take her back on the 
workforce with weekly working time of 30 hours at the mother’s request.
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maximises the lifetime utility of the household of type i under the specific family 
benefits scheme. When expressing a series of combinations, we factor in that one 
family can have up to three children. We then calculate the optimal fertility and 
labour strategy separately for 12 different scenarios – four educational levels and 
three family benefits schemes – that yields the highest lifetime utility.
2.4. Selecting parameter values
We set the model’s parameters in terms of tax and social contribution rates and 
family benefits and the family tax incentive based on their actual value for all three 
periods and regimes. In the model, we regard one as HUF 100,000 and compare 
the other parameters expressed in money to this. The Appendix summarises the 
parameter values.
Under the 2010 regime, in the two-rate tax system, the personal income tax rate 
levied on labour income was 17 per cent for annual income of up to HUF 5 million 
(τ1=0.17) alongside a certain tax credit15 and for income of over HUF 5 million, 17 
per cent for the portion of up to HUF 5 million and 32 per cent for the portion over 
HUF 5 million (in this case, τ1=0.32). The contributions were: 9.5 per cent pension 
contribution (τ2=0.095), 6 per cent health insurance contribution (τ3=0.06) and 1.5 
per cent labour market contribution (τ4=0.015) (NAV 2016). The family tax incentive 
was HUF 4,000 per child (tax1=0.04) in 2010 (SZMM 2010).
In 2011, the tax regime was a single-rate regime with a 16 per cent personal 
income tax rate (that is,(τ1=0.16), but super grossing and tax crediting16 were still 
employed. Among contributions, only the pension contribution changed to 10 per 
cent (τ2=0.1), while the value of τ3, τ4 remained unchanged (NAV 2016). From 2011, 
the family tax incentive granted if a family had children was HUF 62,500 if there 
were one or two children, and HUF 205,000 if there were three or more children 
(tax2(nit)=0.625/2.05) (NEFMI 2011). 
In 2011, the personal income tax rate levied on gross wages was also 16 per cent 
(τ1=0.16). Another change was the increase in the health insurance contribution 
to 7 per cent (τ3=0.07), while all other contributions remain at their 2011 level. 
The family tax incentive remained unchanged between 2011 and 2014, but the 
tax incentive was expanded to encompass a family contribution incentive from 1 
January 2014 (NAV 2016; EMMI 2014).
15  The tax credit was 17 per cent of the wage (but capped at HUF 15,100) and can be fully used if annual 
income is HUF 3,188,000; the tax credit then decreases for higher incomes. Annual incomes in excess of 
HUF 4,698,000 are not eligible for the tax credit (NAV 2016). We took into account the relevant threshold 
value for the tax credit.
16  The monthly amount of the tax credit in 2011 was 12,100 at most, which can be used if annual income 
was 2,750,000, while the rate of the tax credit decreased for higher incomes. Annual incomes in excess of 
HUF 3,960,000 are not eligible for the tax credit (NAV 2016).
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Because the man works all the time if his educational level is i = 1,2,3 and working 
time is normalised to one, Li
m =1  if i = 1,2,3. For the unskilled, this is L0m = 0.15.17 
For the sake of simplicity and easier comparison, we assume that real wage 
applied to the efficiency unit w =1. In the model, we assume that daytime care 
for young children (in a public crèche, family day-care, private crèche or a babysitter) 
represents a cost of p per unit of time for parents irrespective of their educational 
level if the mother returns to the labour market. We compare this value to the 
monthly cost of day-care for an average family,18 so we estimated a cost of HUF 
50,000 in 2011 and a cost of HUF 60,000 in 2014 (p = 0.5/0.6). There is a shortage 
of capacity in public crèches and the existing crèches are overcrowded. If we take a 
closer look at the statistical data, it can be seen that in recent years 33–35 per cent 
of children in crèches were over three years old,19 which means that the children of 
mothers who would like to return to the labour market while receiving the childcare 
allowance or childcare benefits are partially crowded out. In addition, the family 
also faces a cost of k that increases with the number of children if the mother 
resumes work: this cost reflects the utility of the household work performed during 
the mother’s time spent at home. We do not differentiate this cost by educational 
level because we feel that it is not a function of education, but instead it differs 
individually based on how much and what level of household work is deemed 
useful for whom.20
We derived the baseline values of productivity and the parameter values based on 
actual cross-sectional data for 2011 for the 2010 and 2011 versions of the model and 
based on data for 2013 for the 2014 model in the following manner: In the model, 
the temporal productivity profile coincides with the developments in the gross wage 
over time, thanks to the w =1  and Lim =1  assumptions, which allows us to estimate 
productivity parameters based on actual real earnings data. For every gender and 
for all four levels of education, the baseline productivity level at the beginning of 
the life cycle ei ,1
f ,ei ,1
m( )  is based on the average starting gross real wage in 2011 
and in 2013 for the 2014 version.21 For men, productivity follows an exogenous 
17  In the reference year 2011 the employment rate of males with education of less than eight years of 
elementary school was 9.7 per cent, while for those with education at most eight years of elementary 
school 28.7 per cent, for females the values were 4.7 and 17.8 per cent (KSH 2016). Based on this, we set 
the employment of males with education at most eight years of elementary school as 15 per cent, while 
for females it was 0.
18  We must dispel the myth that public crèche places can be accessed free of charge. Prior to 2011, payment 
could be requested for covering the raw material costs of meals and after 2011, a certain portion of 
overheads can be claimed from parents. Since 1 January 2012, the public operator can collect payment from 
parents for the daytime care of children. These fees apply over and above meal fees (Makay – Blaskó 2012).
19  Calculated based on KSH 2014.
20  For instance, the importance or conversely, the substitutability of homemade meals for a family does not 
depend on educational level. For more on the calculation of the cost of household work, see Gábos et al. 
2007.
21  Fazekas – Benczúr – Telegdy (edit.) 2012:372, Figure 6.3.4. and Fazekas – Varga (edit.) 2015:238, Figure 
6.3.4.
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trajectory. We determined the value of productivity parameters α im ,γ im( )   in such 
a manner that the exogenous trajectory of productivity most closely follows men’s 
age-income profile by educational level in 2011 and in 2013 for the 2014 version.22
Women’s productivity trajectory, which plays a role for women with low, medium 
and high qualification, is determined endogenously, because if the woman has 
a child and remains off the labour market, then her knowledge acquired until 
then amortises (δ) and depreciates. We use the values of Fehr and Ujhelyiova 
(2011) for the amortisation rate (δ), i.e. we assume 1 per cent for women with 
low qualification and 2 per cent for women with medium and high qualification. 
We first took into account when and how many children a typical woman of a 
given level of education has and how long she remains off the labour market. The 
estimation procedure is then identical to the procedure used for men. For women, 
we determined the value of productivity parameters α im ,γ im( )  in a manner that 
the “typical woman’s”23 productivity trajectory most closely follows the age-income 
profile by educational level in 2011 and in 2013 given the baseline productivity 
values and the amortisation rate.24
The sum of family benefits for one month provides the monthly amounts used in 
the model. Accordingly, the value of the maternity allowance is TR0=0.053, as we 
distributed HUF 64,125 proportionately over 12 months. The amount of the other 
benefits – the maximum prenatal allowance (TR 1) and childcare allowance (TR 2), 
childcare benefits (TR3), child-raising allowance (TR3), family allowance (TR4) – is 
defined by law; we used the relevant annual amounts for these items. For instance, 
if the net monthly child care benefit is HUF 25,600, we used TR3=0.265 in the model. 
The values of the benefits provided under the family policy regimes under review 
are constant between 2008 and 2014.
The value of the impatience parameter is normally set between 0.9 and 1 for life 
cycle models (Attanasio et al. 2008; Bick 2010; Fehr – Ujhelyiova 2011). Similarly 
to the model of Attanasio et. al. (2008), we used 0.98 as the value of β. For 
the parameters of the utility function, we also used the standard values found 
in the literature when possible. The reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution of consumption, σ, ranges between 1.5 and 2, while ε, which measures 
how much the utility function reacts to changes in the number of children, is around 
1.5. We used the values of Bick (2010): therefore we fixed σ at 1.98 and ε at 1.39. 
Finally, in knowledge of the foregoing, we calibrated Ω, the weight of the number of 
children within instantaneous utility so that – in line with the stylised facts – highly 
qualified families optimally had one child at the age of 31 in the 2010 environment, 
22  See: Fazekas – Benczúr – Telegdy (edit.) 2012:372/Figure 6.3.4. and Fazekas – Varga (edit.) 2015:238, 
Figure 6.3.4.
23  See the list in Chapter 2.
24  See: Fazekas – Benczúr – Telegdy (edit.) 2012:372/Figure 6.3.4. and Fazekas – Varga (edit.) 2015:238, 
Figure 6.3.4.
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while those with low qualification optimally had their child as young as possible. We 
uniformly use these values for the parameters associated with utility for all three 
household types/educational levels and all support environments. The Appendix 
provides a tabulated summary of the specific parameter values.
The majority of the taxation/labour market/productivity/family support parameters are 
estimated based on actual data, and therefore we did not subject them to robustness 
testing. An exception to this is the parameter representing daytime care for small 
children (p), in which a ±20 per cent divergence did not change our conclusions; in 
other words, our results can be regarded as robust for these parameter values. This is 
mainly due to the fact that for families of low and medium educational level, this cost 
is not incurred,25 while for highly qualified families, this expenditure item is so small 
compared to income that a ±20 per cent divergence in the cost does not impact their 
decision. We also performed a sensitivity test for ±5, 10 and 20 per cent divergences 
in the parameter Ω (the weight of the number of children in instantaneous utility). We 
address our results and interpret the tables in the following chapter.
3. Simulation results
Solving the model gives us an answer to the optimal number of children that a 
couple with a specific level of education should have during their lifetime and when 
they should optimally have them under the current benefits system, and when the 
mother should return to the labour market in order to maximise her lifetime utility. 
It should be noted once again that in the model we make the optimal strategy 
of having children conditional exclusively on the family support and taxation 
environment and the level of education, that is, we ignore all other parameters 
(such as changes in values or standards, the spread of new forms of relationships, 
cultural and biological factors and housing status) which, in reality, also shape the 
number of children and the timing of childbearing. Because other influencing factors 
are ignored, the model is only partially able to reflect the observable differences in 
the fertility patterns of families with differing characteristics. In summary, the results 
show the optimal number of children that a given family type should have and 
when they should optimally have them when considering the financial aspects only.
The decision on the right strategy is made by comparing the various temporal costs 
and benefits of having children. Childbirth in a family is, on the one hand, a value 
in and of itself, i.e. it represents a positive benefit throughout the family’s lifetime. 
On the other hand, the parents become entitled to various benefits and allowances 
for many years (income effect), and therefore family benefits positively impact 
consumption and life cycle utility by increasing lifetime income. If the amount 
of benefits increases in parallel with the number of children, or if they become 
25  For families of low and medium educational level, we assume that the mother spends three years at home 
with her children and therefore, there is no need for daytime childcare.
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available only subject to a certain number of children, then the income effect is 
stronger (e.g. the system of tax allowances). But if the amount of benefit per child 
does not increase or increases only marginally in parallel with the total number of 
children, then the correlation is weaker (e.g. family allowance) (Gál 2011).
From another perspective, having children represents substantial expenses for 
the family. These expenses grow as the number of children increases. One of the 
parents – in reality most frequently, and also in the model, the mother – temporarily 
leaves the labour market after the child is born, meaning that she does not receive 
any income and the mother’s expertise acquired until then is eroded during parental 
leave which will, in turn, setback her entire future life cycle earnings (substitution 
effect) (Jones et al. 2010; Gál 2011; Bartus et al. 2013), negatively impacting the 
family’s life cycle consumption and thereby also its life cycle utility. As the number 
of children increases, the value of lost income from work and the mother’s human 
capital amortises to a greater extent (Bartus et al. 2013). Moreover, with age and 
experience, the wage of those with a higher level of education increases much 
more dynamically than that of their peers with a lower level of education, and for 
this reason, they are likely to delay their intention to have children (postponement) 
in order to minimise the impact of the alternative cost of having children on their 
life cycle income26 (Bartus et al. 2013). Therefore, the substitution effect is greater 
overall in families with a higher level of education. However, this is compensated 
by the fact that the earning party in the family will have a higher lifetime income 
throughout his lifetime than a father with a lower educational level. The fact that 
the children also consume, just as the parents, and during early childhood they need 
day-care (direct cost) if the mother returns to the labour market, also represent 
additional costs. However, the model fails to consider that fact that the cost of 
child-rearing increases in parallel with the age of the children.
Overall, the optimal number of children and the optimal time of having them is 
obtained so that the family reaches the maximum lifetime utility resulting from 
the above-mentioned costs and benefits arising during the life cycle. It is of crucial 
importance as to what extent the amount of benefits and tax allowances received 
for the children can compensate the family’s lost lifetime income and the direct 
costs associated with child-rearing. The costs and the benefits associated with 
having children differ for decision-makers with different educational levels and in 
the different family support and taxation environments, and for this reason, the 
optimal outcome will be different for each of them. In our analysis, we compare the 
values of the calculated life cycle utility in the different scenarios. We always take 
as a starting point the “typical fertility- employment life cycles”27 which we deem 
to best reflect reality in the case of an average family with high, medium and low 
educational level. We always compare the values of lifetime utility with the initial 
26  Aspects of economies of scale.
27  We presented the typical fertility-employment life cycles in Chapter 2.
23
The Life Cycle Model of the Fertility Choice in Hungary
case in such a way that, ceteris paribus, we modify some of our initial conditions. In 
the simulation, the final number of children, the mother’s optimal age, the timing of 
having children and the length of parental leave are examined. First, we collectively 
examine the fertility strategy of individuals with low, medium and high educational 
level; we then separately analyse the change in the willingness to have children of 
unskilled couples.
When resolving the model, we took into consideration the current support and 
taxation environment for every regime, while we estimated the gross earnings 
based on the gross income paths based on education in 2011 and 2013 in the case 
of the support system in force in 2010/2011 and in 2014, respectively. However, 
in its current form, the model is unable to reflect the changes in real values (not 
adjusted by inflation), and therefore we should not draw conclusions in the case of 
the different regimes from the comparison of the absolute values of obtained life 
cycle utility. The model can, however, provide answers as to which family support 
environment incentivises more children, earlier employment or, in the case of more 
children, a faster timing to have children. In the following subchapter, we present 
the simulation results and the conclusions we can draw from them in the different 
cases.
3.1. Optimal number of children
Firstly, the main focus of the analysis is to find out how many actual children is 
optimal for the different family types during their lifetime in the different support 
and taxation environment in 2010, 2011 and 2014. For the purposes of the analysis, 
we considered the mother’s time spent with her child/children as constant. The 
preconditions and the results of the simulation are presented in Table 1.
Table 1
Value of lifetime utility of the various types of families in the examined three 
benefits systems, in the cases of zero, one, two and three children
Educational 
level
High Medium Low
Number of 
children
Age
Leave (years)
zero
–
–
one
31
two
two
31, 33
two
three
31,33,35
two
zero
–
–
one
29
three
two
29, 31
three
three
29,31,33
three
zero
–
–
one
27
three
two
27,30
three
three
27,30,32
three
2010 11.841 11.921 11.74 11.634 9.662 9.573 9.484 9.499 8.767 8.722 8.222 8.62
2011 12.021 12.154 12.02 12.148 9.589 9.591 9.568 9.703 8.675 8.747 8.68 8.769
2014 12.337 12.462 12.321 12.474 9.678 9.668 9.659 10.051 8.714 8.755 8.684 8.947
Note: The educational level variable denotes the mother’s and the father’s highest completed 
educational qualification, while the number of children designates the final number of children in the 
family, the age indicates the mother’s age at the time her child/children were born, and the years of 
leave variable denotes the number of years the mother spends at home with her children on maternity 
leave (gyes/gyed).
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Interpretation of the results can be facilitated if we first think over the underlying 
effect mechanisms. As the parameters of the utility function evolve independently 
from both the educational level and the family benefits system, having one child 
for any family type in any environment represents the same additional benefit. 
However, the financial costs of having children depends on the level of education 
and the support and taxation environment. Therefore, it is of key importance what 
percentage of the costs can be compensated by benefits and tax allowances after 
the birth of a child during the life cycle, and as such, what will be the consumption 
per unit in a family, as this is the other factor that influences utility. Compared to 
not having any children, upon having the first, the second and often the third child 
consumption per unit will be increasingly lower during the life cycle which means 
that the benefits and allowances only partially cover the costs. However, the joy 
associated with having children intensifies as the number of children increases. 
Lifecycle utility measures the total value of the current utility taken at present value, 
which stems from whether the damage caused by a decline in consumption due to 
having children or the joy takes precedence.
Accordingly, we can draw the following conclusions from the results of Table 1. The 
utility of families with one child is higher in every case than that of families with 
two children, but it is not always higher than that of families without children. The 
tax allowance system in force between 2006 and 2010 available only for families 
with three or more children was so beneficial for families with low and medium 
educational level that it also encouraged families with only two children to have a 
third child. However, this was not the case for families with higher education having 
only two children. This was attributable to the fact that by having the third child, 
the life cycle consumption decreased only marginally or might have even increased 
compared to having only two children, although its rate still fell short of the life 
standard of families without children or only with one child. Overall, however, the 
joy associated with having children was able to compensate the negative effect of 
the lower consumption cycle for families with a lower level of education. Only in the 
case of families with higher education can we observe that families with one child 
were better off than those without children; in their case, this was attributable to 
the high value of the prenatal allowance and childcare allowance (tgyás and gyed) 
they received.
Thanks to the tax allowances which were extended in 2011 to families with one 
or two children, the situation improved in the sense that having the first child 
put these families in a better position than families without a child. Moreover, 
the tax allowance, which was substantially augmented for three children, reduced 
the cost of child-rearing for families of every educational level to such an extent 
that they could overall achieve higher lifetime utility with three children than with 
only two children, because by having the third child, their life cycle consumption 
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did not decline, but on the contrary actually increased compared to having only 
two children. Although its value still lagged behind the living standard of families 
without children or only with one child, the joy associated with having children 
was able to compensate the reduced utility stemming from a lower consumption 
cycle. This is why we obtained the results according to which families with low and 
medium educational level with three children were even better off than having 
only one child. Our results also proved to be robust when the Ω parameter was 
changed as well.
The child benefit extra (GYED-extra) introduced in 2014 brought about additional 
improvement, as the benefits available at the expense of contributions further 
reduced the cost of having children, and so the system encouraged couples of every 
educational level to have three children. However, not even the measures of GYED-
extra could improve the fact that “it is not worthwhile” to have a second child after 
the first one, as the position of families with two children, no matter what level of 
education, was worse than that of families with one child or without children. This 
is related to the fact that the birth of the second child represents a bigger burden 
for families (reduction of utility during the life cycle), even taking account of the 
supports and allowances, than the amount of joy they gain (increase in utility during 
the life cycle). This may mainly restrain the willingness to have children of those 
earning lower wages.
The described results can be regarded as robust within the ±20 per cent interval 
of the value of parameter Ω in the case of families with low educational level, 
and only within the ±10 per cent interval in the case of families with medium 
educational level. That is, in their case, a greater increase in the weight of the 
number of children tilts the scale in favour of families with two children compared 
to single-child families, but only in 2011 and 2014. We must handle the results for 
2014 with caution for the group with higher education as they react sensitively to 
the change in Ω: if this is reduced by only 5 per cent, we can observe that three 
children do not provide a higher lifetime utility than a single child; there is only an 
improvement in comparison with childlessness and the two-children family model.
3.2. Increasing age of mothers
In the following, we analyse for families with one and two children whether the 
change in the support and taxation environment influences the optimal age of the 
mother in the case of couples with different educational levels. For the purposes 
of the analysis, we considered the mother’s time spent with her child/children as 
constant, in the case of both one child and two children.
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Table 2
Value of lifetime utility of the various types of one-child families in the examined 
three benefits systems considered with advancing maternal age
Educational 
level
High Medium Low
Number of 
children
Age
Leave (years)
one
27
two
one
31
two
one
35
two
one
25
three
one
29
three
one
34
three
one
24
three
one
27
three
one
30
three
2010 11.899 11.921 11.907 9.547 9.573 9.571 8.736 8.722 8.703
2011 12.148 12.154 12.128 9.609 9.591 9.543 8.799 8.747 8.713
2014 12.455 12.462 12.436 9.685 9.668 9.628 8.774 8.755 8.726
Note: See Table 1.
According to Tables 2 and 3, under the family policy regime in 2011 and 2014, those 
who became parents at a younger age could achieve a higher lifetime utility (or the 
improvement was greater) than those having children at a later age, as in 2006, but only 
in the case of couples with low and medium educational levels. This stems from the fact 
that starting from 2011 in the case of those with lower education/wages, the family 
tax allowance also extended to families with one and two children, and the support 
available from 2014 in the form of contribution allowances was able compensate for 
the lost income at a younger age still. The described results are also considered robust 
when the value of parameter Ω changes by ±10 per cent. However, the value differences 
are not significant among the groups with either educational level.
Table 3
Value of lifetime utility of the various types of two-child families in the examined 
three benefits systems considered with advancing maternal age
Educational level High Medium Low
Number of children
Age
Leave (years)
two
27,29
two
two
31,33
two
two
25,27
three
two
29,31
three
two
23,26
three
two
27,30
three
2010 11.659 11.74 9.409 9.484 8.211 8.222
2011 11.971 12.02 9.574 9.568 8.754 8.68
2014 12.27 12.321 9.671 9.659 8.696 8.684
Note: See Table 1.
The legislative changes in 2011 and 2014 did not trigger a turning point for families 
with higher education. They can obtain higher lifetime utility in all three examined 
support environments if they have children above the age of 30 and not below.
A 5 per cent decrease in the parameter Ω shifts the optimal timing for having 
children in families with low and medium educational levels to an older age, but 
in their case, the results are also not sensitive to a 20 per cent increase in the 
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parameter Ω. By contrast, those who are highly qualified would have been better 
off having children at an increasingly younger age in 2011 and 2014 if parameter 
Ω increased by 5 per cent, but if the parameter decreases by 20 per cent, then the 
presented correlations do not change.
3.3. Scheduling the time of having children
In this sub-section, we compare the different scheduling of having children of families 
with three children. For the sake of the analysis, we fixed the mother’s age in the case of 
the first child and only changed it for the second and third child, and we also considered 
the mother’s time spent with her children at home as constant in every case.
Table 4
Value of lifetime utility of the various types of three children families in the 
examined three benefits systems in the case of different timing
Educational 
level
High Medium Low
Number of 
children
Age
Leave (years)
three
31,33,35
two
three
31,33,37
two
three
31,35,39
two
three
29,31,33
three
three
29,31,35
three
three
29,33,37
three
three
27,30,32
three
three
27,30,34
three
three
27,32,36
three
2010 11.63 11.613 11.624 9.50 9.35 9.28 8.62 8.46 8.48
2011 12.15 12.08 12.05 9.70 9.54 9.40 8.77 8.62 8.60
2014 12.47 12.41 12.39 10.05 9.73 9.52 9.95 9.48 9.46
Note: See Table 1.
Based on economic rationality, when having several children, families are better off 
financially if the children are born with the least age difference possible since this 
enables the mother to potentially stay away from work for a shorter period of time 
(less loss of human capital and also loss of life cycle income), and the family is able 
to use the tax allowance available for the three children sooner, or at least part of it.
The family policy regime between 2006 and 2010 did not significantly influence the 
timing of having children for highly qualified couples, but in certain cases a greater 
age difference may have been more beneficial: it is true that the tax allowance for 
families with three children became available only from a later period, but this 
was compensated by the fact that the mother could re-enter the labour market 
between children, and thanks to this, she received more pregnancy and maternity 
aid (tgyás) after the second and the third child (see first line of Table 4). But in the 
case of families with lower education, a smaller age difference between children 
clearly increases lifetime utility.
Highly educated couples who therefore earned high wages were incentivised for 
fast scheduling mainly by the tax allowance regime introduced in 2011, as they were 
already able to access a large part or the entire amount of the tax allowance under 
the 2011 regime. But the value of life cycle utility does not significantly change 
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under either regime when modifying the timing of having children. By contrast, 
the measures of GYED-extra clearly incentivised couples with lower earnings (those 
with low and medium educational level) for faster timing of children bearing. This is 
explained by the fact that the family tax allowance, also extended as a contribution 
allowance, and the rule that the family could be entitled in parallel to family benefits 
for several young children could compensate the costs associated with having 
children to a greater extent. The described results are robust for the ±20 per cent 
change of the value of the parameter Ω for couples of every educational level. In 
this case, the optimal outcomes were not influenced by the pillar of the measures 
introduced in 2014 based on which the mother would be entitled to receive child 
benefit (gyed/gyes) even if she returned early to the labour market, because we 
assume in their case that the mother stays home for three years after the birth of 
every child. This enables us to separately analyse the components of GYED-extra.
3.4. Increasing parental leave
In the following, we compare the fertility strategies prevailing in the case when the 
mother’s parental leave is increasingly long (one or three years). We present the 
analysis only for highly qualified couples with one, two or three children. The results 
obtained for couples with low and medium educational level are presented only 
in the essay part. In the simulation, we left the mother’s age constant throughout 
the period examined.
Table 5
Value of lifetime utility of highly qualified families in the three examined benefits 
systems, assuming increasing parental leave
Educational level High
Support environment 2010 2011 2014
Number of children
Age
Leave (years)
one
31
one
12.03 12.266 12.603
one
31
three
11.816 12.052 12.355
Number of children
Age
Leave (years)
two
31,34
one
11.912 12.188 12.541
two
31,34
three
11.576 11.864 12.145
Number of children
Age
Leave (years)
three
31,34,37
one
11.834 12.28 12.678
three
31,34,37
three
11.439 11.94 12.239
Note: See Table 1.
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For highly educated families, we obtained the rationally expected result that the 
less time the mother spent at home with her child/children, the better (in financial 
terms) for the family under all support schemes, provided that the mother had 
a job. In other words, higher lifetime utility can be achieved if the mother only 
spends one year at home with each of her children after they are born instead of 
two or three years. 
Based on the table’s results, it is also apparent that there is a stronger incentive 
for the mother’s early return to the labour market in 2014 compared to 2010 and 
2011 thanks to the fact that the mother does not lose the childcare allowance if she 
resumes work after her child turns one. The improvement between 2011 and 2014 
is significant for both one, two and three children if measured by the percentage 
change in lifetime utility. In other words the childcare allowance extra (GYED-extra) 
measures foster a faster labour market return of mothers, which claim holds true for 
families with low and medium qualification. The described conclusions are robust 
for changes in parameter Ω, as here, we assumed that the number of children and 
the constraints on childbearing are fixed.
3.5. Childbearing among unskilled families
According to the stylised data and thus also in the model, unskilled families behave 
differently, so we investigate them separately. We symbolise the unskilled couple 
using the following conditions: the mother remains an active throughout her 
lifetime irrespective of the number of children and the father also only works a 
part of the time. The following table summarises the value of lifetime utility if the 
family has one, two or three children paced differently. 
Table 6
The value of lifetime utility of unskilled families under the examined three benefits 
systems, in case of one, two and three children
Educational 
level Uneducated
Number of 
children
Age
one
18
one
23
one
28
two
18,20
two
18,22
two
18,24
three
18,20,22
three
18,20,24
three
18,20,26
2010 5.065 4.558 4.248 5.446 5.325 5.248 6.302 6.232 6.155
2011 5.156 4.525 4.064 5.717 5.705 5.633 7.958 7.907 7.889
2014 5.067 4.374 3.886 7.812 7.671 7.588 8.059 8.014 7.996
Note: See Table 1.
Changes in family benefits schemes did not affect the optimal number of children 
in their case, nor did it significantly impact the timing of childbearing. By and large, 
the optimal strategy for them is to have as many children as possible (three children 
is better than one or two), as this entitles the mother to more benefits. In addition, 
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it is best to have the children as young as possible and spaced close together, as 
this allows the family to take advantage of the benefits derived from the tax and 
contribution allowances applied to the father’s income earned during his part-time 
work and to extend the eligibility period of the family allowance.
The results also show that the rise in the value of lifetime utility is more significant 
in 2011 compared to 2010, thanks to the tax incentive by having a second child after 
the first and a third child after the second. The measure, extended as a contribution 
incentive in 2014, yields a greater improvement than earlier by having a second 
child after the first, measured at a change in the value of lifetime utility. By contrast, 
families are unable to benefit from the high tax and contribution incentive granted 
for the third child to a greater extent, at which point “only” the childcare benefits 
and the family allowance provide an additional incentive.
4. Results and conclusions
In light of the results from the life cycle model, we are able to determine when and 
how many children different types of families, i.e. families of different educational 
levels should have, and when the mother should return to the labour market 
to achieve the maximum lifetime utility given the specific family support and 
tax regime. In other words, the model gives us an answer to how the multiple 
transformations of the family benefits scheme influences families’ optimal 
childbearing and in what direction, with all other things being equal. Due to the 
differences in employment, we analysed the behaviour of families with low, medium 
and high qualification separately from the behaviour of qualified families. As a 
result, the first four points pertain to the first three family types while the last point 
addresses the fertility strategy of unskilled families.
1.  The tax allowance system in force between 2006 and 2010 available only for 
families with three or more children was so beneficial for families with low 
and medium educational level that it also encouraged families with only two 
children to have a third child. However, this was not the case for families with 
higher education with only two children. From 2011, having the first child put 
these families in a better position than being childless. Furthermore, due to 
the significantly increased tax incentive for families granted for three children, 
all couples of every educational level could achieve higher lifetime utility than 
with two children. However, from 2014, we observed that having three children 
is clearly the most beneficial for families compared to having one child/being 
childless. However, a major impeding factor is that it is not “worthwhile” to have 
a second child after the first one in either support and taxation environment.
2.  Among the family support tools introduced, the family tax incentive scheme 
introduced in 2011 has the greatest impact on optimal maternal age, as it makes 
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it worthwhile to have children at a younger age for those with low and medium 
education.
3.  Those with high qualification and thus high income were most incentivised to 
have children at a young age by the tax incentive adopted in 2011 while among 
lower-income families (medium and low qualification), the greatest incentive to 
having children early) were certain elements of the childcare allowance extra.
4.  There was growing incentive for the mother’s early return to the labour market 
after having a child from 2010 to 2011, and then to 2014 for all three educational 
levels.
5.  For unskilled families, the optimal strategy under all three support regimes is 
to have as many children as possible spaced closely together and at the earliest 
possible age. The measures of the childcare allowance extra shaped the optimal 
outcome in that having a second child after the first one resulted in a greater 
improvement in lifetime utility than earlier.
Although we laid the foundations of the model, we do not feel that in its current 
state it is able to fully factor in and assess the impact of all economic and 
institutional factors shaping fertility choices. But building and stimulating the model 
brings us closer to understanding which support elements foster and contribute to 
childbearing from a financial perspective.
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Appendix: Summary table of parameter values
Description of parameter Parameter value
Taxation parameters
Total taxes and contributions on gross wage-
related income
τ=0.345
Personal income tax rate τ1=0.17/0.32/0.16
Pension contribution τ2=0.095/0.1
Health insurance contribution τ3=0.06/0.07
Labour market contribution τ4=0.015
Rate of family tax allowance per child in 2010 (only 
in case of three children) 
tax1=0.04
Rate of family tax allowance per child in case of 
one, two or three children after 2011
tax1(nit)=0.625/2.05 
Labour market parameters
Time spent working by an unskilled man L0
m = 0.15
Time spent working by a man (i=1,2,3) Lim =1
Time spent working by an unskilled woman L0
f = 0
Time spent working by a woman (i=1,2,3) Lif = 0/1
Real wage for efficiency unit w =1
Cost of day-care of young children p = 0.5/0.6
Fixed cost of re-entering the labour market in case 
of one, two and three children
k = 0.5/0.7/0.8
Productivity parameters
Productivity of a highly qualified man during the 
first period (2011/2013)
e3,1
m = 2.172 /2.498
Productivity of a medium skilled man during the 
first period (2011/2013)
e2,1
m =1.207 /1.374
Productivity of a low skilled man during the first 
period (2011/2013)
e1,1
m =1.009 /1.004
Productivity of an unskilled man during the first 
period (2011/2013)
e0,1
m =1.013/9.45
Productivity of a highly qualified woman during 
the first period (2011/2013)
e3,1
f =1.869 /1.933
Productivity of a medium skilled woman during the 
first period (2011/2013)
e2,1
f =1.078 /1.205
Productivity of a low skilled woman during the first 
period (2011/2013)
e1,1
f = 0.927 /0.901
Productivity parameters of a highly qualified man 
(2011/2013)
α3m = 0.1226 /0.097
γ 3m = −0.00693/−0.0052
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Description of parameter Parameter value
Productivity parameters of a medium skilled man 
(2011/2013)
α2m = 0.0636 /0.058
γ 2m = −0.00301/−0.003
Productivity parameters of a low skilled man 
(2011/2013)
α1m = 0.052 /0.0766
γ 1m = −0.0027 /−0.00454
Productivity parameters of an unskilled man 
(2011/2013)
α0m = 0.01855/0.037
γ 0m = −0.00097/−0.00185
Productivity parameters of a highly qualified 
woman (2011/2013)
α3f = 0.1/0.104
γ 3f = −0.0062 /−0.0062
Productivity parameters of a medium skilled 
woman (2011/2013)
α2f = 0.072 /0.0705
γ 2f = −0.00375/−0.00375
Productivity parameters of a low skilled woman 
(2011/2013)
α1f = 0.048 /0.084
γ 1f = −0.0021/−0.0046
Amortization rate of low and medium skilled and 
highly qualified persons 
δ = 0.01/0.02/0.02
Family support allowances
Maternity support TR0 = 0.053 
Maximum net value of the prenatal allowance 
(tgyás) TR
1 =1.3
Maximum net value of the childcare allowance 
(gyed) TR
2 = 0.808
Childcare benefit/child-raising allowance amount 
(gyes/gyet)
TR3 = 0.256
Amount of family allowance per child in case of 
one, two and three children
TR4 = 0.122/0.133/0.16 
Parameters related to utility
Impatience parameter β = 0.98
The weight of the number of children within 
current utility
Ω = 0.123
Reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution of consumption
σ = 1.98
To what extent does the utility function react to 
the change in the number of children
ε = 1.39
